

Reluzenz: On Richard Estes

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In this essay, I put forth an alternative account of Richard Estes's work by taking his realism seriously, instead of subsuming it into the standard postmodern, Baudrillardian interpretive matrix through which American hyper- or photorealism has most often been understood.¹ My primary way of pursuing this line of thought is to return to the dominant feature of Estes's paintings – the complex and stunning play of reflections off a multitude of urban surfaces, ranging from buildings, storefront windows, cars, hubcaps, buses, phone booths, street lamps, consumer objects, and so on – in order to argue that this play of images is the best indication of his realism (Figure 10.1). Simply put, I want to show that Estes's 'reflections' are not merely postmodern simulacra, but that they reveal how the city takes images of itself – interprets, translates, and transforms itself – alluding to a complex reality that cannot be reduced to human perception or the play of signifiers. In order to do so, I want to think about these reflections in relationship to an intriguing optical word that occurs with a very brief intensity in Heidegger's early Freiburg lecture, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, and other cognate lecture courses from those years (1920–22). That word is *Reluzenz*.² In what might be seen as a contradictory and counterintuitive move, at the end of this essay I will return to Baudrillard and enlist him as an ally in my realist interpretation of Estes's work.

The Baudrillardian framework that has enveloped Estes's work almost from the beginning, unfolds from a certain kind of postmodern anti-realism, in which the signature feature of his paintings, the dizzying play of reflections, is taken as a pictorial version of the 'play of signifiers'; a radical 'semiurgy', to use Baudrillard's own terminology, in which we are completely enveloped in an atmosphere of images, signs, and information. Fredric Jameson makes explicit the connection between these reflections and a radical condition of simulation in *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of*



10.1 Richard Estes, *Telephone Booths*, 1967, acrylic on Masonite, 122 x 175.3 cm.
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Late Capitalism: 'architecture ... remains the privileged aesthetic language [for postmodernism]; and the distorting and fragmenting reflections of one enormous glass surface to the other can be taken as paradigmatic of the central role of process and reproduction in postmodernist culture'.³ Taken in this light, Estes's paintings are not about the world out there, independent of human thought and access, but rather explorations in reproductive processes (copies of copies of copies of ...), and modes of human perception informed and determined by these processes. Like the urban reflections they explore, Estes's paintings are what Jameson calls 'machines of reproduction'.⁴ Furthermore, the multiple layers, relays, and relationships between photography and painting involved in the process of creating his paintings, has reconfirmed him as the artist who best exemplifies a condition of endless mediation through a nesting of reproductive technologies, which Baudrillard's writings on the *simulacrum* make explicit.⁵ Not to belabor the point, but it is hardly coincidental that hyperrealism – the name given to the movement in France – is also a key phrase in Baudrillard's lexicon.⁶

Jameson still provides the most succinct characterization of the predictable interpretive moves resulting from this account of Estes's work: drawing on and recycling the old avatars of the American realist legacy – ranging from the Ashcan School of painting, to Edward Hopper, to Charles Sheeler, to the

photographic work of Walker Evans – hyperrealist art converts their hard-edged, sober account of social and political reality into a hallucinatory, *mise en abyme* of reflective surfaces constitutive of the photorealist cityscape. What that entails is a new ‘depthlessness’, in which an urban world dominated by exchange value, has transformed into an image of itself, resulting in a reign of spectacle and simulacrum. Although we are many years on from the late 1980s and early 1990s, this interpretation, albeit with variations, has remained the dominant and all-encompassing framework for assessing photorealism. However, it seems to result in two interpretive dead ends which are oddly but necessarily interrelated: any reference to reality is lost and cancelled out in this perpetual play and relay of signifiers, thus reinforcing the claim that Estes’s work is primarily interested in issues of human perception, and the fundamentally phenomenological coordinates of how the world appears for us such that the ‘world is what we perceive’.⁷ Thus, this interpretive matrix swings between a radically postmodern view of his work and an implicitly phenomenological take on his achievements. Both are fundamentally anti-realist statements. Is there another way to think about these reflections that does not lead us down either of these paths, and that does not turn his mirror play into a hall of mirrors – a dizzying proliferation and play of images? My way of thinking about these reflections in another light is through Heidegger’s word ‘relucence’.

Relucence and Reflection

The German word *Reluzenz* is a translation of the Latin word *reluceo*, in English ‘relucence’, which might be translated as ‘reflect a gleam’.⁸ In early Heidegger, the word is a way of articulating how ‘life’ and ‘world’ are not two separate conditions but rather imbricated and equi-primordial. Relucence is an early articulation of how Dasein is thrown in the world among other beings, such that life and world are intertwined. But more than this, it suggests the ‘movedness’ of factual life, such that we are reflected in and by the things in the world that we are involved with. Life has a certain pull, inclination, and seduction that always manifests in our ‘being-transported’ from, of, and to the world. As such, life is entangled in the world and its objects. Relucence refers to the ‘genuine movedness of life’, or what more technically Heidegger calls ‘movedness in facticity’.⁹ According to Heidegger, the inclination of life from and of world is reflexive, in that it reflects light back on itself out of those involvements and concerns. Relucence is that movement of ‘reflecting back’.

Thus, relucence is a way to situate reflection in the world and in relation to its factual condition, rather than it referring to ‘theoretical-psychological reflection’, or in terms of a ‘subjectivistically ego-less isolation’.¹⁰ Relucence is an optical term that allows Heidegger to critique idealist notions of reflection

that would presume to distance us from the world in order to secure our encounter with it: 'I encounter myself in a world which acquires and takes its determinate meaningfulness from my own self, but in which the self "is" not there *qua* self, and where the "from my own self" is neither reflectively given nor explicitly placed on stage with this reflection.'¹¹ Despite the apparent critique of the self, it is abundantly clear that the term 'relucence' is an anthropocentric and Dasein-centred interpretation of the facticity's movement. Relucence is life coming to terms with the movement and inclination of Dasein's life-world, no matter how imbricated and determined by world that caring is. Even if experience is reconceived such that it no longer stands out from the surrounding world, it is still a 'self-worldly experience'.¹²

Heidegger returns to an extended discussion of reflection in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, making both implicit and explicit connections to the term 'relucence' he explored six years earlier. He begins by clarifying his earlier sense of the term as a critique of idealist notions of reflection: 'Dasein thereby knows about itself without explicit reflection in the sense of an inner perception returned on itself but in the manner of finding itself in things.'¹³ To preserve a dimension of reflection that would not succumb to the present-at-hand implications involved in idealist notions of self-reflection, Heidegger emphasizes its optical dimension so that we will not understand reflection as 'the ego bent around backward and staring at itself ... but [as] an interconnection such as manifested in the optical meaning of the term "reflection". To reflect means, in the optical context, *to break at something*, to radiate back from there, to show itself in a reflection from something'.¹⁴ Heidegger then offers a sharp and concise gloss on this thought: 'as the Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to it from things'.¹⁵ But notice how quickly this optical sense of reflection, 'to break at something' – which is not given any particular directionality or 'target' subsequent to that breaking – is now precipitously fixed within a specific coordination: a reflection back to the human-world relationship.¹⁶ Dasein always finds itself in and out of things, but never finds things in themselves.¹⁷ It is evident that Heidegger is not elucidating a conception of relucence that is a feature of the world itself, but rather of our involvement and thrownness in the world, which is underway before any notion of reflection constitutive of modern self-consciousness might emerge. Thus, it matters little whether Dasein is thrown in the world, and thus can never get back behind its own thrownness, reflection is still beholden to what Quentin Meillassoux has aptly called 'correlationism': the claim that the human-world relationship should take priority above all others.¹⁸

The critique of any idealist notion of reflection, which would entail cleaving us apart from the world and the things in it, is radicalized even further by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. His earlier work echoes Heidegger in his critique of self-reflection: 'the world is always "already there" before

reflection begins ... and all its [phenomenology] efforts are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing that contact with a philosophical status'.¹⁹ But Merleau-Ponty goes much further in *The Visible and the Invisible*, where he begins to explore concepts, such as 'anonymous visibility', 'hyper-reflection', 'flesh ontology', and 'wild being', which would begin to raise the possibility of an optics and perception beyond the human realm, thus unhinging reflection from any stable grounding in phenomenological intentionality.²⁰ Even though Merleau-Ponty pushes a notion of perception that is not the act of a subject towards an attentiveness to a more robust ontology of the visible world – a development that influenced Lacan's lectures on the gaze – it is clear that even his claim that the 'mirror anticipates, within things, the labor of vision' more than reflection does, 'because there is a reflexivity of the sensible', is still yoked back to a dyad of seeing/visible that is still fundamentally anthropocentric.²¹ Furthermore, as Deleuze has claimed, there is the sense that Merleau-Ponty's flesh ontology – particularly when he is talking about art – is still too 'fleshy' to allow percepts, affects, and sensations to stand up on their own, autonomously and independently of the human organism.²² Perhaps we need to push the word 'relucence' in such a way so that it is not the mediating term between self and (object) world, and is not chained to Dasein's facticity. Relucence needs to be rethought in such a way that it is not invested in keeping its human-oriented conception intact, and its participation in a certain logic of 'emancipation' as the re-appropriation of a relationship to self lost in a process of separation (jumping ahead a bit, I would say that Heidegger and Baudrillard's emphasis on seduction – and Harman's notion of allure – are more or less a critique of that sense of emancipation).²³ That is to say, we ought to be thinking about a non-Dasein, non-human dimension of the word 'relucence', that would articulate a sense of the world reflecting itself in its own movements, and the movement between objects.

As is so often the case, Heidegger offers the most provocative hints to an inverted reading of his own concepts and terminology. So using his language, I want to radicalize his characterizations of relucence in relationship to world, without necessarily referring it back to Dasein. This would entail paying close attention to notions of inclination, movement, and dispersion in his discussion of relucence and world; taking seriously the language of 'seduction' and 'allure', which are two words specifically raised in Heidegger's discussion of relucence, ruinance, and world; and entertaining the possibility that 'intentionality' – and thus issues of interpretation (hermeneutics), translation, and metaphor – might be emergent in the world, and not just from Dasein's factual involvement in it. There are subtle intimations and subterranean currents in Heidegger's discussion of relucence, which suggest that the world has its own inclinations that resist any interpretation of the 're' as a 'moving back', such that Dasein is reflected back to itself through its objects, cares,

and concerns. Instead, reluctance would suggest a condition in which things reflect each other, including humans, but without privileging humans above those things, or seeing them as the primary vector through which these relations make sense.

What emerges from the term 'relucence', in its most crystalline moments, is a world that sparkles, dazzles, ricochets, bounces off, scatters, and destabilizes. At this point in Heidegger's career, when much of his terminology is still in flux, the word *Reluzenz* still demonstrates what Graham Harman has called the 'realist flavor' in his writings, which is always in conflict with his developing account of ontological difference, and its emphasis on the unbridgeable gulf between being (Sein) and Being (Dasein).²⁴ Relucence is (too) quickly subsumed into his subsequent language of facticity and human finitude, which comes to dominate his analytic of Dasein. Originally taken as a more neutral term, 'relucence' is subsequently incorporated into the language that is used to describe Dasein's 'fallenness' (in the early lectures characterized by another Latin work, *Ruinanz*), 'entanglement', 'absorption', 'dispersion', and 'bedazzlement' in and by the world, which would seem to carry 'one' away from its more authentic modes of being, and into the seductive 'everyday' realm of the 'they'.²⁵ It is hardly surprising then that David Farrell Krell should resort to a mirror metaphor to underline a conception of reluctance in terms of fallenness: 'Dasein is reluctant ... that is, it tends to interpret itself in the mirror of all the "handy" things that surround it. We are bedazzled and benumbed by beings, opaque to the being-here (the Da-sein) that we are.'²⁶ Instead of objects essentially *being* mirrors they are mirrors inclined towards and for Being.

But we should heed Heidegger's warning that this 'fallenness' is constitutive of Dasein, and not simply epiphenomenal: 'Dasein's essence already contains a primordial bestrewal [*Streuung*], which is in a quite definite respect a *dissemination* [*Zerstreuung*].'²⁷ Derrida has continuously elucidated this point in his emphasis on a 'preontological envoi' in Heidegger's writings that does not gather itself together.²⁸ What is interesting to note, is that Derrida also returns to an optical word to describe this *Zerstreuung*: 'An "effraction" invades every renvoi from the start.'²⁹ This optical effect would also seem to survive – indeed, thrive – in what Jeff Malpas calls the 'iridescence' of Heidegger's language, in the sense of its constantly shining and showing different facets.³⁰ Perhaps we might characterize it as his compulsion to explore the resonances and refractions between words – their assonances, dissonances, resonances, tautologies, and metaphors – such that they continually generate new images, metaphors, and echoes without ever exhausting the substance of those words. This is the reluctant world explored in Estes's paintings.

Evenly Suspended Attention and the Object-Act of Perception

His Manhattan seems to live inside a glass ball, struck by rebounding light, as though it were being observed and as though it had to be observed through a photographic lens, which nevertheless needs painting to be 'truer.'

—Nico Orengo³¹

Although there are aspects of Nico Orengo's observations that trouble me, his observations are astute. The rebounding light careening off glass surfaces, often with subtle gradations of relative transparency and opacity in works such as *OGY* (2002), seems to resonate with Orengo's passage and are an apt characterization of the reflections in Estes's paintings (Plate 9). But there is a sense in Orengo's passage that the author might mean this literally, such that he imagines Manhattan inside a small snow-dome, struck by rebounding light, with its source coming from outside of that glass ball. That strikes me as wrong. There is no sense at all that the light in Estes's paintings is generated from anywhere specific or external at all. And we are not positioned outside of this 'relucence' as if we might watch, gather, and make sense of that rebounding light. There is no origin, seen or unseen. I think the better analogy to our not being elevated above the city or the painting – looking into and at it from afar, thus mastering its relucence – is found in his early works such as *Bus with Reflections of the Flatiron Building*, or *Prescriptions Filled (Municipal Building, 1983)* (Plate 10 and Figure 10.2). In the former, the young man staring out a window of a public bus, in seeming existential isolation, is reflected twice in the adjacent car's rear window and trunk. Although it would seem that we might read the image from the stronger realistic image of the young man, to his diminished and increasingly effaced visage in the reflections, it is much more compelling to read it the other way around, such that a full-look or perception is built up from within the 'object-act' of reflection and its handling in paint. Or perhaps, even more precisely, that we should not overmine or undermine this image in terms of the directionality of these reflections, but see them as providing images of what it is like to be a face, to ride a bus, to be a bus, to have a facial image-on-a-car, to explore the sensory qualities of a bus through a car, signs, a flat iron building, rivets, and mirrors. These object-acts of reflection are all densely packed in the painting, such that we get the sense that there is no space for a clearing and lighting *on* these objects, but rather that they are illuminating each other, without completely exhausting their reality.

It is as if with one more shiny surface, one tiny movement, one further inflection of paint, some other aspect of this urban world would come to light. Simply put, if one looks closely, Estes's paintings broaden the possibility of beings, rather than constricting it to the existential drama of Being, or reducing reality to simulacra – unless, that is, we are willing to take seriously



10.2 Richard Estes, *Prescriptions Filled*, 1983, oil on canvas, 91.44 x 182.88 cm.
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Baudrillard's claim that 'excess is the world's excess' and that seduction and its emphasis on appearance is 'the sphere in which putting beings into play is a kind of ethic'.³² The reluctant qualities of this 'gleam' are distributed throughout the painting, but the act of reflection tends to prise apart and scatter that gleam such that it is no longer bound to a particular pattern or recognizable configuration. Like the gaze decentred from the eye in Lacan's seminar 'Of the Gaze as *Objet Petit a*', the gleam is diffused 'in its pulsatile, dazzling and spread out function'.³³ For example, witness the bright white outline of the bus window, which begins to unbind in the white markings on the hood of car. The young man looking out the window is not the master of that reluctance, but merely part of its mirror play. The slight dab of white paint on the side of the young man's nose is echoed by other unhinged dabs of white paint on the hood of the car, and on the stained bus windows. And these gleams of light – captured in the white highlights – are also all over the spectacles depicted in the display window of *Prescriptions Filled*, which are pointing in all directions, as if to disarticulate the smooth coordination of look and gaze, vision and optics. One finds that 'gleam' everywhere: in the street, cars, windows, trees ... Reluctance does not come from elsewhere, outside of the painting, and it is not primarily the result of a reflection that reflects us in things, but rather is moving among all objects in Estes's paintings, such that any human figures that might appear are merely one other element in a myriad of relationships that are not necessarily dependent on human interaction or even presence. Which is to say that city is infinitely inflected here and now.

The closest analogy I can come to Estes's visual approach to the built environment – most often, a particular aspect of New York – is Freud's analogy of the unconscious to the city, and his account of the technique of evenly suspended attention, which would give access to that unconscious.³⁴ The most famous example of this analogy occurs in the opening pages of *Civilization and Its Discontents*, in which by a 'flight of imagination' he imagines the city of Rome – like a psyche – in which nothing is destroyed, thus preserving *all* its changes, restorations, preservations, destructions, and ruinations from the oldest configuration of *Roma Quadrata* to its present day situation. In such an imaginary condition, an 'observer would perhaps only have to change the direction of his glance or his position in order to call up the one view or the other'.³⁵ As Freud well captures, the city is not comprised of discrete architectural typologies, but rather is a vertiginous reflection and refraction of multiple temporal and spatial layers. But I would claim that this condition is hardly isolated to Rome, or even ancient cities, but rather it is the condition of all vibrant cities, past and present. Most importantly, this is what the city does to *itself*, and thus this 'shifting glance' is not solely dependent on human vision. In Estes's paintings it is the reflective surfaces which take on this shifting vision, reflecting and refracting the complexities of the city, such that you might have ancient Guatemalan religious art, brick and terra cotta-clad buildings, glass and steel skyscrapers, sidewalks, cars, glimpses of blue sky, and all these buildings and surfaces further reflecting and taking glimpses of other buildings and objects, such as in *OGY* (2002); or, the Robert Hall building, signage, a parking garage, and blue sky reflected off of the windshield and hood of a car, with glimpses of a sidewalk and other signage next to it in *Robert Hall Reflections* (1969) (Figure 10.3).

I would argue that the optical model is the driving image for seeing and perceiving the city for Freud, and not the human viewer per se.³⁶ For example, in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud offers the reader an optical schema of the unconscious, which is not localizable in one anatomically distinct area, but is represented in terms of being permeable to something analogous to light that refracts and changes from layer to layer.³⁷ There is a long tradition of using optical devices to think about the possibility of a sensible world and its configurations, untethered from human 'use' filtered by self-consciousness and intentionality. One of the privileged examples is the kaleidoscope, a device raised by Adorno in terms of music, and Baudelaire in terms of urban spectatorship.³⁸ Through its arrangement of mirrors, it provides a multitude of visual patterns that are mechanical in nature. It thus can approach a literal an-arche of sense; a taking on of shape and configuration, without recourse to human intentionality.³⁹ For Adorno, it is taken as a negative example of what music might look like in terms of a phenomenal linking of sounds bereft of intentionality, somewhat



10.3 Richard Estes, *Robert Hall Reflections*, 1969, oil on canvas 91.44 x 121.92 cm.
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analogous and inverse to Baudelaire's claim that the urban spectator was a 'kaleidoscope gifted with consciousness'. What we get from Estes is a city of infinite objects, aspects, and differences, but with all of them left refracted and suspended, thus avoiding the drive to hierarchize elements within the painting. It is as if the paintings loosen up the particulars of each object – its parts, its qualities – redistributing them across the surface of the canvas. This reluctant sense of the city is not directed back to anyone, but rather is fully committed to elucidating the full complexity of the city, without leaving anything out, even the smallest letter, most insignificant building, anonymous car, flower, or fire hydrant.

If we are willing to consider the city as a model for the unconscious, we might also consider that the 'technique' most fully capable of accessing that unconscious is what Freud called 'evenly suspended attention'. But in contrast to Freud, I am claiming that this technique is performed by the city itself on itself. Evenly suspended attention is a receptive, and non-judgemental technique of psychoanalytic thought, which urges the analyst to pay attention to *everything* the analysand says, down to even the most insignificant gesture or utterance, without hierarchizing or judging. It is worth quoting Freud in full here:

The technique, however, is a simple one ... It consists simply in not directing one's notice to anything in particular and in maintaining the same 'evenly suspended attention' (as I have called it) in the face of all that one hears ... For as soon as one deliberately concentrates his attention to a certain degree, he begins to select from the material before him; one point will be fixed in his mind with particular clearness and some other will be correspondingly disregarded, and in making this selection he will be following his expectations or inclinations. This, however, is precisely what must not be done. In making the selection, if he follows his expectations he is in danger of never finding anything but what he already knows.⁴⁰

In the hands of artists such as Estes, it was a model for dispersing attention over figure and ground at the same time to avoid prematurely isolating, selecting, and systematizing phenomena, so that one might delay judgment, heighten sensitivity, and learn from the existing environment. In Estes's paintings, the myriad reflective surfaces in the urban environment offer the city multiple 'pure mirrors of a smooth surface', analogous to the analyst who remains indifferent to the analysand – keeping him or herself in reserve to avoid empathic identification, and to allow the latter's voice to drift uncoupled from expressive signification, in order to respond to it with concomitant acts of 'free association'. What the 'cold technique and eye' of evenly suspended attention articulates is the Heideggerian condition of 'it is not there'; which is to say, a kind of vacuum or a reserve that is inaccessible in its depths, while simultaneously offering a smooth surface, so that its mode of reflection is indifferent in its receptivity to taking and receiving images of other objects. In Estes's paintings it is the reflections that accomplish this task.

The multiple encounters between Estes's camera and the highly reflective surfaces of the city is of a piece with this technique, and it is also practiced by objects between each other. Thus, in one sense Nico Orengo is right, it is 'as though it [New York] had to be observed through a photographic lens'. But in many ways, we are getting a view of that city from the objective lens itself, and not from the perspective of the viewer behind the lens looking at it through the viewfinder. Thus we are exposed to the lens' reflective surface, or the virtual array behind it, as it captures reluctant image-shards from the city. In numerous interviews, Estes repeats over and over again that all parts of the painting are of equal interest and importance. There is no hierarchy in his image taking or making. Freud specifically notes that if an analyst 'begins to select from the material before him; one point will be fixed in his mind with particular clearness and some other will be correspondingly disregarded'. Four oft-noted features of Estes's *technique* are best explained in terms of the demand for an evenly suspended attention and clarity, as opposed to allowing one point or aspect to dominate against a field of hazy and disregarded ones. First, Estes's always keeps a sharp depth of field throughout his paintings, which allows all details their equal weighting, without any imposed hierarchy.

This attention to each thing in hyperrealism has led Lyotard to claim that hyperrealist painting is an 'art of catalogues'.⁴¹ Second, the way Estes builds up his paintings beginning with the application of large (or generalized) painted areas in acrylic, then proceeding to an application of fine-grained details in oil, suggests that ontological difference emerges from ontological indifference. Third, the fact that Estes finishes all those details at once, instead of finishing each one separately, indicates that he is extending the technique of evenly suspended attention all the way to the final moments of the painting's 'completion', such that it would permeate the canvas from 'start' to 'finish'. Fourth, the numerous photographs that Estes takes of each locale for his paintings are simply a necessary requirement in order to capture the infinitely complex nature of the city, in which everything is potentially meaningful, according to the technique of evenly suspended attention.

Estes's paintings unravel a sense of concentration and attention, redistributing energies rather than binding them together in a privileged embrace with the observer, so that many of the things that we take to be human-centered activities, such as hermeneutics, translation, and withdrawal, happen in the world and between objects. In many ways, Estes's paintings take literally Bruno Latour's claim that there is no 'vehicle' and no 'transportation' without translation. Each and every car, bus, subway, escalator – or, for that matter, every shop front or architectural facade – provides a receptive surface that subtly translates other vehicles and transportation devices. This might account for the 'dense' atmosphere in Estes's painting. Although they are often bereft of people, they are teeming with movement, reflections, and images, such that there is no 'room' for what Heidegger would call clearing and lighting. It is as if an overpopulation of people in the paintings might lure us into believing that these surfaces are merely the settings that provide the 'space' in which human action takes place. If there are human figures in his paintings, they are lightened of their mass and substance, such that they retain an altered inclination and weight, which is then evenly distributed among all the other objects and surfaces in the urban environment. This opens up the possibility for some very weird worlds of translation and interpretation, in which a storefront is reflected by hubcap; or a bus with passengers is translated by the rear window of a car; or a row of subway seats is interpreted by the shimmering roof of the subway itself.

But it is important to note that these reflections do not simply scatter pure surface qualities from one opacity to another; rather, they explore the tensions between a surface and an inaccessible depth, that can only be indicated by these surface qualities and sensations but can never be reduced to them. This is simply to suggest that there is an 'excess' to the city and each thing in it – including each and every perception – that is beyond any pragmatic use or view of the city. And even beyond any view or image of it. In fact,

one might say, that Estes is involved in what Baudrillard would call a 'fatal strategy'; a logic that pushes the classical conception of the simulacrum as an 'emanation of things' to an excessive degree, in order to show a play between the subterranean qualities of things, that are never completely accessed by us or by other objects, and the seductive 'allure' of their surface qualities that intimate those depths. Baudrillard's conception of seduction is a radical mode of exteriority that emphasizes not only appearance as the sphere for 'putting beings into play', or as a 'detournement of being', but also behind which 'everything withdraws behind its own appearance and is, therefore, never identical with itself'.⁴² In many ways, Graham Harman's notion of 'allure' – and his 'speculative' realism more generally – is an implicit radicalization of Baudrillard in its claim that objects do not encounter each other directly, but rather through the images they take of each other.⁴³ More recently, Harman claims that objects interact with other objects at the price of turning them into images.⁴⁴ Thus, one could argue that the relucence and mediation evidenced by the plethora of reflections in Estes's paintings – the fact that we find beings 'adrift in a sensual realm' – is the best indication of their exuberant realism.⁴⁵ And it is precisely the relucence nature of his paintings – the dispersion, scattering, and loosening of images from objects, sensual qualities from real qualities, aggregates of features from substances – that comprise the allure and seduction in these paintings. In Harman's realism, 'allure' is the aesthetic condition in which the bond between a thing's unity and its plurality of specific qualities loosens and unbinds, thus alluding to a subterranean excess, that neither humans nor other objects can ever completely and directly access or exhaust. When Heidegger talks about relucence and ruinance in his early lecture courses, the words 'seduction' and 'allure(ment)' are also raised.⁴⁶ This is hardly surprising as it is through exposure to the world that Dasein is drawn towards and entangled in it, and literally finds itself outside itself in its care and involvements that always carry it away from its 'authenticity' into the everyday world of the 'they' and curiosity. In many ways, Harman takes Heidegger's sense of allure and gives it its full ontological and worldly status, shorn of its negative and 'emancipatory' connotations.⁴⁷

At the same time, he radicalizes Baudrillard's conception of seduction, and shows its 'unthought' connections with Heidegger. Thus, our full enmeshment in a sensual realm might be the best indication of a rich plurality of beings, and the seductive nature of a reality always alluding to unseen depths, excesses, and possibilities in things, which are not dependent on their appearance and existence for us. This sense of allure is fully alive to the world and its reality, and not simply a condition of relucence as fallen, or seduction as the reign of simulation; rather, it is indicative of a world fully replete with complex reality, revealed in and through images. Because objects only encounter each other vicariously – that is, through their alluring qualities – they never access

things in themselves directly, but only through images. And these images, appearances, and perceptions are not simply simulacral, but are also fully beings themselves.

The fiction that Graham Harman comes up with in his book *Circus Philosophicus* to demonstrate this condition in which each object takes images of other objects as their form of indirect contact, is a multitude of isolated 'offshore drilling rigs' siphoning other objects through their tubes.⁴⁸ No rig can siphon an object fully, as it is perpetually drawing images of things, without exhausting them. For example, 50 rigs could siphon the same cat, with the result being 50 cat-images, and that cat could possibly remain unmoved by the exercise. But the drilling rig is just an opening gambit for Harman's larger claim that we should 'grant all objects the power to act as oil rigs ... We can literally imagine all rabbits, monkeys, electrons, acids, and freight trains as equipped with pipes and tubing of their own ... All real objects ... now have the power to interact with all other things, at the price of turning them into images'.⁴⁹ The important point to note is that like a drilling rig reducing all entities to fuel, 'each object reduces every other object to a hazy caricature of its deeper plenitude'.⁵⁰ Objects do not encounter each other directly, but only indirectly in the form of 'images', or, to use the language of some other speculative realists, translations and metaphors.⁵¹ But those images, translations, and metaphors are fully real beings in themselves.

To return to Nico Orengo's quote that begins this section, we might want to consider again why 'his [Estes's] Manhattan' is depicted 'as though it were being observed and as though it had to be observed through a photographic lens'. Perhaps we should take a lesson from Bergson on photography and consider Orengo's claim as exploring the possibility of objects taking images of other objects. Here is Bergson's stunning passage on photography from *Matter and Memory*: 'But is it not obvious that the photograph, if photograph there be, is already taken, already developed in the heart of things and in all points of space?'⁵² Perhaps we might consider that taking photographs of Manhattan might have alerted Estes to the fact that objects are always taking photographs of other objects, and that this multiplicity points to an exuberance of being that far outstrips the very limited range of photographic images solely taken by humans? His taking numerous photographs for each painting is an attempt to come as close as possible to that reality and to participate in it, thus acknowledging the temptation of reducing photography to a model of human perception.

What then are we to make of the last sentence from Orengo's quote that claims that this photographic vision needs painting to be truer? In contrast to Lacan's claim that painting 'tames the gaze (*le dompte-regard*)' in his seminar 'The Gaze as *Objet Petit a'* – and Hal Foster's interpretation of Estes's paintings as an anxious taming of the Lacanian object-gaze by pacifying and sealing the traumatic 'real' in surfaces and appearances, thus relaxing and protecting

the viewer from its grip – it rather works in tandem with photography to enhance the material look and perception of things, and the perception between things, in all its exuberance, thus further decentering the gaze from the control of the eye/I.⁵³ It is precisely the co-imbrication of painting and photography that intensifies the prismatic and refractory conditions of seduction. Estes's paintings do not so much 'tame the gaze' as slow it down, thus suspending and diffusing it in all its 'pulsatile' and 'dazzling' qualities in order to provide what Baudrillard calls a 'technical asceticism of the gaze (via the photographic lens), which protects the objects from aesthetic transfiguration – a certain nonchalance of the lens to bring out the cast of things, without forcing matters ... it settles "literally" on the surface of things'.⁵⁴ The only reservation here is that it is precisely the mutual supplementation of painting and photography in Estes's work that enables a technique of aesthetic 'transfiguration', which further enhances the material cast and outlook of things, such that the city 'reflects' on its own existence, and does not simply consist of our representations of it.

Conclusion

Is Richard Estes's work a 'hall of mirrors', in which everything is reduced to the play of signifiers, copies of copies, infinite reproductions and simulacra? Perhaps we might look at this from another perspective. In many ways Graham Harman's realism wants to ensure that 'substance' is not completely dissolved into relations, without any excess or inaccessible reality. A 'hall of mirrors' would simply be that complete sublation of substance into relation, or to use Baudrillard's term, reproduction. Drawing on Leibniz, Harman suggests the possibility of a reinvigorated form of substance, which would prevent it from collapsing into a network of relations. We might imagine this in terms of a plethora of monads 'refracting' each other, taking images of each other, without entering or necessarily depleting the deeper recesses of those objects. What results is a 'dis-appearance', to use Baudrillard's terminology, in which there is simultaneously something held back, and an appearance put forward. For example, in Estes's work there are multiple images taken of a skyscraper taken from the perspective of a car hood, front window, hubcap, storefront, or light bulb. And this imaging is hardly discrete in that the building, in turn, might be taking images of the car, and the car might be imaged from the perspective of a bus. But these objects do not exhaust the reality of those other objects in taking images of them. In fact, what they point to is the excessive nature of entities that can't be reduced to those images, while those images simultaneously allude to the excessive nature of reality that exceeds our ability to imagine how strange it can be. We are definitely involved in a mirror play, but hardly in a hall

of mirrors. In Estes's work we are directly in contact with a 'seductive' technique that puts us in touch with the images objects take of other objects. His paintings acknowledge this strange reality through their technique, which shows how this translation occurs. It is only in this very precise sense that we can say that his realism is 'constructed'. That is to say, it is not that buildings have become 'text' or 'image' – mere simulacrum – but rather that Estes's paintings are an exploration of the consequences of a logic in which there is interpretation, translation, and imaging between objects, which can't be reduced to solely human-world correlates of meaning, or the mere play of signifiers. Estes's work explores this reluctant world, which enriches our ontology through its painterly vision rather than depletes it by postmodern simulation and simulacrum.

Notes

- 1 This interpretation and emphasis on the simulacrum in Baudrillard's work has, as Tilottama Rajan has pointed out, 'led to simplifications of [his] work as capitulating to a banal postmodernism of mechanical reproduction'. See Rajan, *Deconstruction and the Remains of Phenomenology: Sartre, Derrida, Foucault, Baudrillard* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 282.
- 2 Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 87–97. But the entire part 3 on 'Factual Life' is relevant here (61–115). In this regard also see the related discussions of factual life finding itself in objects in *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, trans. John van Buren (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), and *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). These three lecture courses all date from Heidegger's early Freiburg years (1920–22), while he was still teaching as a docent before his move to Marburg. The optical or reflective theme is not explicit in *Being and Time* – I believe it occurs only twice. See *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), sections 16 and 21. The thread of this optical terminology picks up again in Heidegger's important discussion of 'reflection' in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 158–76. There is not too much secondary literature on the term 'relucence', but the following works include sections, which grapple with the term to various degrees of depth and purpose: David Farrell Krell, *Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Krell, 'The "Factual Life" of Dasein: From the Early Freiburg Courses to *Being and Time*', in *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his Earliest Thought*, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 361–79; Krell, 'The School of Stupefaction,' *World Picture*, 2 (Autumn 2008): np; Francois Raffoul and Sean Eric Nelson 'Introduction', Francois Raffoul, 'Factual Life and the Need for Philosophy', and Rudi Visker, 'Intransitive Facticity? A Question to Heidegger', in *Rethinking Facticity*, ed. Francois Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 1–24, 69–88, and 149–91; John D. Caputo, *Demythologizing Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 47–50; Michael Eldred, 'Dialectic of Self and Other: Wrestling with Plato, Hegel, Heidegger', <http://www.arte-fact.org/untplcl/dlctclsf.html>.
- 3 See Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 37 and 49. Of course, Baudrillard himself commented on such reflections in New York: 'the vertiginous façades reflecting each building to the others'. See, Baudrillard, *America*, trans. Chris Turner (London and New York: Verso, 1988), 16. It is hardly surprising that the architect Baudrillard has been in the closest dialogue with is Jean Nouvel, whose interest in the reflective properties of glass is well known. See Jean Baudrillard and Jean Nouvel, *The Singular Object of Architecture*, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). Reinhold Martin offers some interesting commentary on this passage by Jameson, and new interpretations of these mirror reflections in relationship to the oil industry in Texas. See Martin, 'Materiality: Mirrors', from *Utopia's Ghost: Architecture and Postmodernism, Again* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 93–122. For other readings on reflections in architecture, see K. Michael Hays, *Modernism and the Posthumanist Subject: The Architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer*

(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), and Rosalind Krauss, 'The Grid, the /Cloud/, and the Detail', in *The Presence of Mies*, ed. Detlef Mertens (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996). It is important to note that Jameson sees this depthlessness actually existing out there in architecture, for example in the Bonaventure Hotel and the Wells Fargo Court building, where the object world itself has 'become a set of texts or simulacra'. Mirrors came to 'represent' the most extreme form of simulation and hyperrealism in Baudrillard's work. For example, take the following sentence from Douglas Kellner's online entry on Baudrillard from *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: 'as simulations proliferate, they come to refer only to themselves: a carnival of mirrors reflecting images projected from other mirrors'.

- 4 Jameson, *Postmodernism*, 37.
- 5 As Jean-Claude Lebensztein notes, in Charles Harrison and Paul Wood's comprehensive anthology, *Art in Theory, 1900–1990* (Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992), the entire photorealist movement is represented by two-and-a-half pages of Baudrillard's writings on simulation and the simulacrum – entitled 'The Hyper-Realism of Simulation' – taken from *Symbolic Exchange and Death*. See, Jean-Claude Lebensztein, 'Hyperrealism USA, 1965–1975', in *Closer than Fiction: Hyper Real Reader* (Walther Konig, Koln: Verlag der Buchhandlung, 2011), 193.
- 6 The moniker 'hyperrealist' – for what is most-often called photorealism in North America – is probably directly influenced by Baudrillard's use of that term, which is coextensive with the rise of the photorealism from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s. Jean-Claude Lebensztein notes that by 1972, the term 'hyperrealism' took hold as the dominant term in France for this movement. In the Anglo-Saxon world, it still competes with the terms 'super-realism' and 'photorealism.' The latter is the preferred term in North America. See Lebensztein, 'Hyperrealism USA, 1965–1975', 191–3. Of course Baudrillard himself at one point had a strong interest in hyperrealism in art. See Baudrillard, 'Revenge of the Crystal: An Interview by Guy Bellavance', trans. Paul Foss and Julian Pefanis, *Revenge of the Crystal: Selected Writings on the Modern Object and its Destiny, 1968–1983* (London: Pluto Press, 1990), 22. This interview took place in 1983. Also see Baudrillard, 'La réalité dépasse l'hyperrealisme', *Peindre, Revue d'Esthétique* 1 (1976): 138–9, and 'Esquisse d'une économie de l'hyperrealisme', *L'Art Vivant* 36 (February 1973): 9–12.
- 7 Lee Braver, *A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 185. However, this is not going as far as George Berkeley might have it in his well-known dictum that 'to be is to be perceived ("Esse Est Percipi").'
- 8 See the English/German and German/English glossary in *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, 157–60.
- 9 Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, 87–97.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 71–2.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 72.
- 12 Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 10.
- 13 Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 159.
- 14 *Ibid.*
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 These passages are important as they make clear that Heidegger is not against opticality as such, as one might reasonably assume, given his well-known account of the fate of being, in which phenomenal appearing and presencing is concealed in favor of optical presence and visibility in Western thought. Heidegger is fundamentally critiquing all forms of present-at-hand, and not opticality as such. For a succinct account of opticality in relationship to Heidegger's history of being, see David Michael Levin, 'Decline and Fall: Ocularcentrism in Heidegger's Reading of the History of Metaphysics', *Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 186–217. Although there are many instances where Heidegger summarizes these thoughts, a particularly pithy example can be found in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 66: 'The view is now only the optical (*optisch*).' To repeat, what Heidegger is fundamentally critiquing is the present-at-hand, and not merely opticality.
- 17 Jean-Luc Nancy has elucidated Heidegger's inability to think the thereness of the thing 'in itself' without a return to the self and as a correlate of intentionality in 'The Heart of Things', *The Birth to Presence*, trans. Brian Holmes and others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 183–5.

- 18 See Quentin Meillassoux, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 5. For elucidations of the 'correlationist' hypothesis – and more generally, 'philosophies of access' and their manifestation in different strands of speculative realism – see Ray Brassier, 'The Enigma of Realism', *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 49–85; Graham Harman, *Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Harman, 'Anti-Copernicus', *The Quadruple Object*, 44–7.
- 19 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 2000), vii.
- 20 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and Invisible*, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 142 and 253. See Martin Jay's brief analysis of this beyond-human conception of vision in his essay, 'Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and the Search for a New Ontology of Sight', in *Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision*, ed. David Michael Levin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 170–77. Levinas criticizes Merleau-Ponty for his interest in non-human worlds of reflection in *Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 112. Luce Irigaray takes the opposite position in her critique of what she considers to be the fundamentally solipsistic, narcissistic, and misogynist dimensions of his flesh ontology. See Luce Irigaray, *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). For succinct accounts of how phenomenology falls firmly within the correlationist position, despite its imperative to go 'back to the things themselves' through our factual engagement with the world, see Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 160–61; Graham Harman, *Circus Philosophicus* (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2009), 57–62 and 68–9, and *The Quadruple Object* (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2011), 20–34. If I could sum up these critiques, they claim that the phenomenological tradition privileges the human world correlation, and thus it is fundamentally only interested in issues of translation, hermeneutics, perception, and intentionality that occur within that nexus. Most speculative realists would like to see those qualities demonstrated by and between all beings not just between human beings and the world of beings.
- 21 Merleau-Ponty, 'Eye and Mind', *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. J.M. Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 168. There was a complex exchange of ideas between Lacan and Merleau-Ponty that is difficult to track in a strict legacy of chronological influence.
- 22 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 164. Importantly, they note that sensation, percept, and affect are 'beings'.
- 23 See Jacques Rancière's critique of this sense of emancipation in *The Emancipated Spectator*, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2009), 15.
- 24 The actual term 'ontological difference' first appears in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927), and is developed further in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1929–30). However, its basic premise was articulated in different terminology, for example as the 'ontic' and 'ontological' in *Being and Time* (1927), and in the earlier work, in terms of the 'extant' and the 'existent'.
- 25 Many of the negative connotations of 'relucence' as related to 'falling' and 'dispersion' are derived from the biblical/religious language of St Augustine. For example, see Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*. For a more general treatment of philosophical interpretations of the biblical 'Fall' in Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, see Stephen Mulhall, *Philosophical Myths of the Fall* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). It is interesting to note that Mulhall insists on talking about Heidegger solely in relationship to Kierkegaard, and Wittgenstein solely in relationship to St Augustine. In doing so he misses the opportunity to address Heidegger's phenomenological interpretations of St Augustine's *Confessions* which, I believe, are equally or even more relevant in this context. Theodor Kisiel is attune to this connection in his careful study of the conceptual and etymological resonances between caring, curiosity, and falling in Heidegger's interpretation of St Augustine. See Theodor Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). I am very interested in a revitalization of curiosity for precisely the reasons Heidegger disdains it. Simply put, the kinds of work that I am interested in are fully saturated with curiosity. Cavell's frequent references to the Fall – including his important discussion of it in relationship to Kant's Copernican turn and the impossibility of knowing the "thing-in-itself" – are also relevant here.
- 26 David Farrell Krell, 'The School for Stupefaction', 7.
- 27 Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 139.

- 28 For example, see Jacques Derrida and Catherine Malabou, *Counterpath: Travelling with Jacques Derrida* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 154–5; Derrida, 'My Chances/Mes Chances', *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 352–3; Derrida, 'Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference', and 'Envois', *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, vol. 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 17–26 and 127.
- 29 Derrida, 'Envois', *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, vol. 2, 127.
- 30 See Jeff Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 37.
- 31 Nico Orenego, 'Manhattan Mirrored', in *Richard Estes: The Sensuousness of the Real* (New York: Skira, 2007), 116.
- 32 Baudrillard, *Passwords*, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2003), 23.
- 33 Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book XI, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 89.
- 34 For a short but precise account of the city in relationship to the unconscious, see Christopher Bollas, 'Architecture and the Unconscious', *The Evocative Object World* (London: Routledge, 2008), 47–8, and Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. James Strachey, vol. 21 (1927–31), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (New York: Norton, 1961), 32.
- 35 Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 34. To my mind much too much emphasis has been placed on the archaeological aspects of this comparison at the expense of understanding it in terms of the city and perception within urban conditions.
- 36 Needless to say, in speaking about Estes's paintings – and (late) modern urbanism in general – this optical model can never be purely optical. Which is to say, Freud's model of the unconscious in and as the city needs to be supplemented with Lacan's analogous account of the city, which is shot through and through with words, language, and signs. His particular example is not ancient Rome but rather Baltimore in the crepuscular light of dawn, with heavy traffic and fading neon signs seen from a hotel window. This leads him to the following thought: 'I remarked to myself that exactly all that I could see, except for some trees in the distance, was the result of thoughts actively thinking thoughts, where the function played by the subjects was not completely obvious.' See Jacques Lacan, 'Of Structure as the Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever', in *The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man: The Structuralist Controversy*, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 186–200.
- 37 Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, vols 4–5, trans. James Strachey, *The Complete Standard Edition* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953). For a brief commentary on this optical scheme, see Jacques Lacan, 'Of the Network of Signifiers', *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 45.
- 38 Theodor Adorno, 'Music and Language: A Fragment', *Quasi Una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music* (London: Verso, 2012), 3: 'Music bereft of all intentionality, the merely phenomenal linking of sounds, would be an acoustic parallel to the kaleidoscope.' For Baudelaire and other examples of the kaleidoscope, see Tom Gunning, 'From the Kaleidoscope to the X-Ray: Urban Spectatorship, Poe, Benjamin, and *Traffic in Souls* (1913)', *Wide Angle* 19.4 (1997): 25–61.
- 39 Of course the kaleidoscope can also represent the most extreme example of human manipulation, self-reflection, apperception, and intentionality, which is evident in both Baudelaire and Adorno's conception of the kaleidoscope, as well as Benjamin's use of this 'metaphor' in the *Arcades Project*, and Marx and Engels' reference to it in *The German Ideology*.
- 40 Sigmund Freud, 'Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis (1912)', in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. and ed. James Strachey, vol. 11 (London: Hogarth Press, 1958), 111–20. To my mind, the best commentary on this text is still Lyotard's, 'Rewriting Modernity', *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 24–35. I have discussed the influence of the techniques of evenly suspended attention and suspended judgement in regards to both architecture and photography in the postwar period. See *I AM A MONUMENT: On Learning from Las Vegas* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008) and 'Ed Ruscha, Heidegger, and Deadpan Photography', in *Photography after Conceptual Art*, ed. Margaret Iversen and Diarmuid Costello (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 28–49.
- 41 Jean-François Lyotard, *Assassination of Experience by Painting: Monory*, trans. Sarah Wilson (London: Black Dog Press, 1998), 109.

- 42 For the 'play of beings' and 'detournement of being' see Baudrillard, *Passwords*, 23 and 93. For the claim that 'everything withdraws behind its own appearance', see Baudrillard, *The Perfect Crime*, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 1996), 2.
- 43 For brief and lucid explanations of the basic parameters of Graham Harman's object oriented ontology – his 'guerrilla realism' – see Harman, *Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects* (Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing, 2002), 120–21 and 288–96; Harman, *Circus Philosophicus*, 48–51 and 68–9; Harman, *The Quadruple Object*, 44–7 and 69–75. For passages which elucidate his conception of allure and indirect causation – a particularly compelling situation when sensual surface traits loosen themselves from a withdrawn real thing and allude to that withdrawn entity, such that an object is torn apart from its own qualities – see, *Circus Philosophicus*, 63–4 and 79–80; *The Quadruple Object*, 69–75 and 102–4; and *Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things* (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 143; and 'On Vicarious Causation', *Collapse 2* (2007): 211–21.
- 44 Harman, *Circus Philosophicus*, 47–8.
- 45 *Ibid.*, 68: 'human life is adrift in a sensual realm'.
- 46 Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, 73.
- 47 It is worth reiterating that a neutral or more positive notion of the 'they' is always operative in Heidegger's account of 'fallenness' and the everyday that countermands any notion of authenticity, the proper, and the exceptional.
- 48 Harman, 'Offshore Drilling Rig', *Circus Philosophicus*, 39–51.
- 49 *Ibid.*, 48.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 49.
- 51 Levi Bryant, 'Translation', *The Democracy of Objects* (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Court Publishing, 2011), 167; and Ian Bogost, 'Metaphorism', *Alien Phenomenology, or What It's Like to Be a Thing* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 61–84.
- 52 Damian Sutton, *Photography, Cinema, Memory: The Crystal Image of Time* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 45.
- 53 The issue of the 'taming of the gaze (*le dompte-regarde*)' is raised in a few different places in Lacan's *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. Hal Foster raises the gaze in relationship to Estes's painting, and hyperrealist/superrealist art in general, in a section entitled 'Traumatic Illusionism', in *The Return of the Real* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 136–53.
- 54 Baudrillard, 'Photography, or Light-Writing: Literalness of the Image', *Impossible Exchange*, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2001), 185.