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general is largely *ecstatic*—it noncognitively decenters the subject of experience, exemplifying a type of decentering that can have cognitive implications or effects but is itself not "cognitive." Second, ecstatic experience transports us out of the everyday, out of the ordinary, and into the realm of the extraordinary, a realm that breaks free of "everyday conventions of speaking and acting," breaks its relation to everyday ("innerworldly") learning, and so offers a momentary transcendence of the mundane. "Explosive experiences of the extraordinary have migrated into an art that has become autonomous" (Habermas, 1992, p. 51). Third, however much ecstatic experiences open our eyes to new ways of seeing, to new horizons of possible meaning, their eye-opening character is inadequate to genuine problems that pile up "in the world." To think of them as offering potential solutions to problems in the world is to erase the difference between what is proper to the extraordinary and what is proper to the everyday. Anyone familiar with the aesthetic theories of Schopenhauer and the early Nietzsche will notice how much Habermas's account of aesthetic experience converges with their noncognitive view of art as opening up a sphere of experience far removed from the mundane world we habitually inhabit, liberated from "everyday conventions of speaking and acting." It is no wonder, then, that he has such great difficulty finding a place for art in his theory of rationality, or a place for aesthetic world disclosure in his theory of the lifeworld. From the very outset, it is placed outside the everyday lifeworld in an "extraordinary" sphere of its own, thus making intractable the problem of how to reconnect it to the lifeworld.

Habermas's second failure to reincorporate art into his system not only casts art adrift from reason (once more, through no fault of its own, art fails to conform to a concept of reason external to it), it also casts out of the lifeworld the practices and activities of disclosure, having failed convincingly to connect everyday learning and world-disclosing capacities and their cognitive-practical import. Habermas, in an important essay on Charles Sanders Peirce, eventually recognized the inadequacy of this aestheticizing move, conceding that practices of disclosure cannot be restricted to aesthetic contexts, and thereby are easily neutralized as a skeptical threat (Habermas, 1992, p. 106). The capacities for disclosure and problem solving, for disclosure and critical reflection, come in a bundle, or not at all; they cannot be neatly separated from one another, but are radically interdependent. In the end, Habermas's critique of Nietzsche and his aestheticizing poststructuralist disciples backfires, for he remains just as much in the grip of a picture in which the realm of art and aesthetic experience is and must remain the "other of reason." Only a more and more capacious conception of reason can liberate us from the grip of such a picture. (Kompridis, 2006).

[*See also* Gadamer, Hans-Georg; Heidegger, Martin; Kant, Immanuel; Marxism; *and* Romanticism.]

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Nikolas Kompridis

HABIT. At times it would seem as if modernist art and aesthetics was pitted *against* habit, often interpreting it as the very impossibility of aesthetic experience and judgment in its capacity to deaden perceptual sensitivity. It is hardly surprising then that many of the salient texts and manifestos of modern art, architecture, philosophy, and literature argue against fixed habits. Walter Pater's "Conclusion" to *The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry* (1980) is perhaps the most eloquent in making this claim: "To burn always with this hard gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life. In a sense it may even be said that our failure is to form habits: for, after all, habit is relative to a stereotyped world" (p. 189).

Habits are often negatively associated with continuity, stability, and the repetition of previous forms of behavior, and thus often seen as an impediment to the modernist desire for change, flexibility, heightened sensory response, and new ways of being. Definitions of habit, such as the "unconscious repetition of previous acquired acts," tend to emphasize habit's automatic qualities. For many, the word "habit" invokes those "bad habits" or "addictions" that people just cannot break. Often these are practices that were efficacious at a certain time but have become a hindrance to efficient performance, living in the present, and moving forward. In modernism, when the very notion of the past and its given modes of transmission could no longer be assured, issues of habit and automatism become privileged sites of exploration.

One of the Greek words for habit—*hexis*—indicates its ability to hold and endure, imparting a degree of stability and continuity—or even rigidity—to our character, bearing, and mode of doing things (comedy makes great use of this aspect of habit). Thus, another definition of habit might characterize it as the active immanence of the past in the body that informs present actions in an efficacious, orienting, and regulating manner. Because of this ability to provide stability, and to give shape and substance to our bearing and actions, our modes of inhabiting and residing, architectonic dwelling is often the privileged exemplification and objectification of the sedimentation of habitual actions over time. As Pierre Bourdieu (1990) notes: "inhabited space—and above all the house—is the principle locus for the objectification of the generative schemes" (p. 89). The dialogue on habit consistently draws on architecture to construct the performative space it engenders through its codetermining existence as both action and object, being and having, transitive and intransitive. This strong connection between habit and architecture is attested to by the etymological links between another Greek word for habit, *ethos*, and its roots in the earlier word *ethea*, which refers to dwelling as a conduct and way of abiding in a particular habitat, and between *Gewohnheit* and *Wohnen*, *habitude* and *habitation*, habit and habitation. Thus some of the most persistent modernist concerns about preventing the formation of enduring habits to take hold are registered in architecture. Le Corbusier's rallying cry for a new architecture was predicated on the claim that "architecture is stifled by custom." The futurist architect Antonio Sant'Elia wanted to foster a kind of architecture and urbanism from which "no formal or linear habit can grow." Needless to say, the fear of the numbing and atavistic effects of habit is also an ethical and political one: a concern that entrenched and unquestioned habits would eat away at our capacities for critical response, for new ways of living and being in common.

But the resistance to habit in aesthetic modernism is only half the story. Many of the same texts require the formation of habits to foster the possibilities of refined aesthetic response, innovation, flexibility, change, freedom, and an overcoming of the inertia of past practices. So here one might consider another definition of habit: the sedimentation of history within the body that actualizes the past in the present without calling upon its conscious representation. Thus what is repetitive is not merely stultifying, it is also a freedom, in that we do not have to consciously think about what we are doing all the time. Nietzsche rightfully calls attention to "the hell of a life devoid of habits and demanding perpetual improvisation."

Rhythms of Habit Formation. The standard accounts of habit suggest that we only become aware of them when "tools"—including the body as the originary form of *techne*, technique, and technological reproducibility—break down and resist us, or when we self-consciously look at them in acts of vision and theory, as in Heidegger's tool analysis in terms of "present-at-hand" and "ready-to-hand" equipment in *Being and Time* (1927), or when we take up a new task, or through purposeful techniques such as "estrangement." These accounts tend to emphasize habit as a perpetual adjustment and readjustment of our organism to the environment and to its own idiosyncrasies. Thus habits are not only stable structural conditions for the continuity of identity and experience, but also porous and open to innovation. As Walter Benjamin put it, "All attentiveness has to flow into habit, if it is not to blow human beings apart, and all habit must be disrupted by attentiveness if it is not to paralyze the human being" (2005, p. 592). This rhythm often involves a constant shifting between habit's stabilizing, repetitive, automatic aspects and its destabilizing, innovative, and intentional ones. Of course, the key question is, can one make sense of this rhythm?

Perhaps the most vexed question that dogs the modernist obsession with habit is the following: how does a habit come about, or, how does one inculcate a habit for perpetual change, an ability to *reflect* on habit in order to refine it, prevent it from ossifying, and then for it to sink back down only to be analyzed again, in a permanent rhythm of making and breaking habits? Notions of "self-analyzing habit" put forth by Charles Sanders Peirce—a process of building beliefs and habits and at the same time describing or analyzing the rationale behind their construction—as well as Foucault's notion of "habitual self-reflection," Dewey's "continuous reconstruction," or Michael Polanyi's "analysis and integration" are attempts to come to terms with this dilemma. Although these accounts often name its basic rhythmic action, they do not always offer convincing accounts of how a habit is formed, broken, or changed.

On Nature and Culture. In the dominant pragmatic-phenomenological interpretation of Heidegger's tool analysis, ready-to-hand objects tend to withdraw and disappear into networks of habitual use and tacit implementation. Thus habit can function to engender a world completely mediated by human history, and invested with the full apparel of sociocultural significance. Habit then solely becomes another way to internalize the external world not simply as a naturalized culture, but as a completely culturalized nature; either a dilation of ourselves into the world, or contracting and absorbing the world into us. Although habit is seen as absorptive and immediate—beyond or before reflection—it has also been seen as the primary mechanism that posits and produces a semipermeable boundary that would inaugurate our emergence from sensory immersion and immediate reaction, thus forging a crucial step toward abstract thought, generalization, virtuality, judgment, and the construction of a second autonomous nature. Habit is thus seen as the crucial threshold where the body might cease to be a foreign object and become imbricated by "spirit."

Those with a realist inclination, or simply a deep mistrust of human-centered accounts of knowing the world, are suspicious of habit because it seems to be one of the fundamental ways of securing the primacy of the human-world relationship over all others. But there are other ways of looking at habit that do not have to be reduced to either of these positions. Félix Ravaisson, Henri Bergson, and Gilles Deleuze saw habit as a supple mechanism and supplement to negotiate between matter and consciousness, cause and effect, necessity and freedom, activity and passivity, nature and culture, automatism and will.

Between Fragility and Domination. There is always a menacing, aggressive, and incorporating dimension of habit that tends to swallow up everything in its path, including external objects, and potentially even difference itself. If Deleuze emphasized habit's ability to draw difference from repetition, the reverse is also true. Habit often swings widely and wildly between fragility, idiosyncratic particularity, and aggressive identity thinking and domination. Although habit operates in the realm of automaticity and the unthought, its particular negotiation between being and having—an engendering of the self from one's own way of being—can be taken as a possibility for creative "work on the self," a free granting of the self (an "impropperty" as Giorgio Agamben calls it), or a prime opportunity for capitalist modes of propriety, property, and ownership to take hold. It is hardly surprising that one of the first self-help books, Maxwell Maltz's *Psycho-Cybernetics* (1960), has a chapter titled "You Can Acquire the Habit of Happiness," that habit specialists work for large corporations, or that neuroplasticity is now a featured component of advertising for improving intelligence through brain exercises. But if habit is indelibly marked by automaticity and an "unthought" dimension, which resists incorporation by the "I," then surely it is not merely and wholly recoverable as the mark of the human's cultural imprint on everything.

Thus "second nature" also implies nature's unruly and alien return. There is always an excess of substance at the heart of things, and at the heart of habit, which can never be completely subsumed by any grace, spirit, fluidity, transparency, network, or particular "world" of significance. Habit is therefore not primarily evidenced by the frictionless, smooth running of things, or the stumbling over of things in order to become conscious and recognize them "as" broken tools, but rather by the irruption of substance, when it is most threated by a total permeation by spirit, pragmatism, or use. Habit can open us up to a state of ontological indifference, which would begin to unravel our commitment to ontological difference. There are moments within the rhythm of habit formation that alert us to a different duration and disposition that would slow us down, open our eyes, suspend our judgment and render us indifferent, in the sense that we become hyperaware of minute differences, without necessarily hierarchizing those differences, or prematurely subsuming them within a realm of significance, pattern of meaning, or network.

Writing Habit. Habit is often thought of as a kind of prepredicative experience, and thus concomitantly a radical critique of the discursive field and the subject of representation as the primary loci of the production of meaning and interpretation. But it is crucial to think about how habit is not only inscribed and implicated within bodies, but also how it is exscribed and bodied forth in word and image. Heidegger's ontological claims are often engendered though alliteration, tautology, assonance, and resonance between words, which helps construct the literary force of habit. Although Bourdieu forthrightly critiques Heidegger for precisely such rhetorical flourishes, it is clear that his own phraseology is integral to manifesting habitus' rhythmic movements between its transitive and intransitive modalities. Phrases that articulate the movement between incorporated and objective structures, such as "structured structures" and "structuring structures," are rhythmical chiasms, which are meant to impact us viscerally in their invocation of the supple flexions of the habitus, which are almost tautological in their alliterative transposability. A practice of writing always manifests a particular ethos or habitus through its rhythmic spacing and timing, its systole and diastole, its repetitions, its syncopated beat. Indeed, habit's complex temporality and historicity often invokes a mode of prophetic and proleptic writing that is responsive to its own immanent becoming.

[*See also* Bergson, Henri-Louis; Bourdieu, Pierre; Comedy; Deleuze, Gilles; Embodiment; Everyday Aesthetics; Foucault, Michel; Heidegger, Martin; Humor; Indifference; Modernism; Ontology of Art; Pater, Walter Horatio; Peirce, Charles Sanders; Phenomenology; Pragmatism; *and* Transdisciplinary Aesthetics.]

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ARON VINEGAR

HADID, ZAHA. *See* Architecture: Modernism to Postmodernism.

HAIKU. A major Japanese verse form, haiku consists of seventeen syllables and contains a word suggestive of the season. Prior to the twentieth century, it was called *hokku* (opening verse), because it served as the first verse of a poetic sequence known as *haikai.* Today it is composed as an autonomous poem, and even a *hokku* written in the premodern period is called a haiku when it is singled out and appreciated independently of other verses that follow it in the original text.

The early aesthetics of haiku centered around humor, for *haikai* as a poetic form started in reaction to the tradition of elegant court poetry that had dominated the Japanese poetic scene from the eighth through the fifteenth century. By introducing elements of humor, pioneers of *haikai* in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries tried to liberate poetry from aristocratic court culture and make it more appealing to a large number of commoners who had become literate and begun participating in poetic activities. As the following example by Nishiyama Sōin (1605–1682) illustrates, the main ingredient of haiku humor was often incongruity arising from a surprising comparison, although wit, wordplay, parody, and slangy colloquialism were also employed as devices to elicit laughter:

wisteria vines
round the pine—an octopus
climbing up the tree!

By and large, humor in early haiku was lacking in intellectual and emotional depth because it was derived more from clever manipulations of words or literary conventions than from keen observations of nature or human nature.

Matsuo Bashō (1644–1694) elevated haiku to a mature poetic form by setting up high aesthetic ideals and writing outstanding poems that embodied them. One such ideal was *sabi* (loneliness), originally a medieval concept connoting sad recognition of universal human loneliness. Bashō, as a postmedieval poet, added a more humanist meaning to the concept by believing in the pleasure of loneliness. Reportedly, he found *sabi* in the following haiku, in which the two old men, whose job is to "watch" fragile cherry blossoms, have learned to accept the mutability of life and are enjoying themselves in a chat.

two blossom-watchmen
with their white heads together
in a chitchat

Bashō's second major aesthetic ideal, *karumi* (lightness), leans even more toward postmedieval humanism. *Karumi* is contrasted with "heavy" beauty, the type of beauty that emerges out of a poem dealing with a weighty philosophical theme. Yet, it is not the opposite of "heaviness"; rather, it is a dialectic transcendence of it. One of the haiku that Bashō thought had *karumi* presents a scene of falling blossoms:

under the trees
soup, fish salad and all
in cherry blossoms

Although medieval poets would have made the scene into a "heavy" poem by striking home the transitoriness of life, this haiku focuses on the enjoyment of picnickers who are eating, drinking, and singing under the blossoms. With fallen petals all around them, these people are not unaware of their mortality, yet they accept it as part of the process of nature. Such earthly images as soup and fish salad, alien to the aesthetics of court poetry, appear side by side with the elegant image of cherry blossoms and help to create a new type of poetic beauty.